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Power, Politics, and Education: Canadian  
Universities and International Education in 
an Era of New Geopolitics 
Abstract
This paper focuses on the recent political spars between Canada and Saudi Arabia as well as China and their impact on 
Canadian universities. It asks three questions: (1) What key issues did Canada’s political strains with Saudi Arabia and China 
raise for Canadian universities’ international education (IE) initiatives and what issues were absent? (2) What do these key 
issues suggest about Canada’s approaches to IE in an era of new geopolitics? and (3) What implications can be drawn from 
these cases about Canadian university-government relations in the context of new geopolitics? Given the powerful role media 
plays in education policy, a systematic study was conducted across three main media sources to identify 74 articles and 
news releases between August 2018 and November 2019. Three dominant themes are identified and analyzed, each vividly 
illustrating the close ties between global politics, government foreign policy and IE within Canadian Universities. On the one 
hand, the narratives speak to concerns about IE as a risk to national security and, on the other, as a vehicle for Canada’s 
economic prosperity. However, what the media has not achieved is a broader discussion on how Canada needs to revisit its 
IE objectives and approaches in light of broader geopolitical shifts. Using the theoretical framework of soft power, the paper 
speaks to the limitations and short-sightedness of Canada’s approach to IE as soft power in this era of new geopolitics and 
concludes with three recommendations for Canada. 
Keywords: soft power, international education, geopolitics, internationalisation, and international relations
Résumé
Cet article se concentre sur les répercussions sur les universités canadiennes des tensions politiques récentes entre le 
Canada et la Chine et entre le Canada et l’Arabie saoudite. Il pose trois questions : (1) Quels sont les problèmes causés par 
ces tensions politiques pour les initiatives d’éducation internationale des universités canadiennes, et quels problèmes sont 
exclus? (2) Que suggèrent ces problèmes quant aux approches du Canada en ce qui concerne les initiatives d’éducation 
internationale à l’époque de la nouvelle géopolitique? (3) Quelles sont les implications sur les relations entre les universités 
canadiennes et le gouvernement du Canada dans le contexte de la nouvelle géopolitique? Puisque les médias jouent un 
rôle puissant dans les politiques éducatives, nous avons mené une étude systématique auprès de trois sources médiatiques 
et retenu 74 articles de journaux et communiqués de presse entre août 2018 et novembre 2019. Il en ressort trois thèmes 
principaux qui illustrent les liens étroits entre la politique mondiale, la politique étrangère du gouvernement et les initiatives 
d’éducation internationale au sein des universités canadiennes. Il y a deux narratifs concurrents : d’une part, celui selon 
lequel l’éducation internationale serait une menace pour la sécurité nationale canadienne et d’autre part, celui selon lequel 
l’éducation internationale contribuerait à la prospérité économique du Canada. Cependant, les médias n’abordent pas la 
question plus vaste de la manière dont le Canada devrait revoir ses objectifs et ses approches en matière d’éducation inter-
nationale à la lumière des grands changements géopolitiques. L’article utilise le cadre théorique du soft power pour discuter 
des limitations et du manque de vison de l’approche du Canada en ce qui concerne l’éducation internationale comme soft 
power à l’époque de la nouvelle géopolitique. La conclusion inclut trois recommandations pour le Canada.
Mots-clés : puissance douce, éducation internationale, géopolitiques, internationalisation et relations internationales
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Introduction
This paper focuses on the media coverage of recent po-
litical spars between Canada and Saudi Arabia as well 
as China and their impact on Canadian universities. Two 
incidents initiated an avalanche of diplomatic tensions. 
First is a tweet from the office of Canada’s Foreign Min-
ister on August 3rd, 2018 that read: “Canada is gravely 
concerned about additional arrests of civil society and 
women’s right activists in #SaudiArabia, including Sa-
mar Badawi. We urge the Saudi authorities to imme-
diately release them and other peaceful #humanrights 
activists” (Foreign Policy Canada, 2018). Second is the 
arrest of Meng Wanzhou, deputy chairwoman of the 
board and chief financial officer of China’s telecom giant 
Huawei, in Vancouver on December 1, 2018. Our inter-
est in these cases stems from a curiosity to understand 
how an era of new geopolitics—China’s rise, diminish-
ing U.S. dominance, the possibility of a new Cold war, 
and economic multi-polarity—and a global political re-
configuration is impacting Canadian universities and 
Canada’s approaches to international education (IE) 
(Falk, 2012; Gunn & Mintrom, 2017; Jones, 2017). 
Scholarship on higher education and media ac-
knowledges the powerful role that media plays in fram-
ing education policy problems, setting policy agendas, 
and gatekeeping access (El Masri, 2020; Saraisky, 2015; 
Stack, 2007). Through a close study of three main me-
dia sources, and considering the ongoing tensions, we 
identified 74 articles and news releases between August 
2018 and November 2019 in order to consider three 
questions: (1) What key issues did Canada’s political 
strains with Saudi Arabia and China raise for Canadian 
universities’ IE initiatives and what issues were absent? 
(2) What do these key issues suggest about Canada’s 
approaches to IE in an era of new geopolitics? (3) What 
implications can be drawn from these cases about Ca-
nadian university-government relations in the context of 
new geopolitics? Organized in four sections, we start 
with our theoretical framework and research methodolo-
gy followed by a report of our thematic findings. Finally, 
in our discussion we address our three research ques-
tions and conclude with three recommendations for Can-
ada’s engagement with IE in an era of new geopolitics. 
Theoretical Framework  
Soft power is attributed to a country’s ability to affect an-
other to obtain outcomes it wants through attraction rath-
er than coercion or payment (Nye, 1990). It is centred on 
appeal and cultivation of attraction to alter behaviour of 
countries to influence policy and agenda setting (Nye, 
2008). It was initially introduced to explain that Japan’s 
economic strength in the 1980s did not mean the de-
cline of U.S. hegemony (Cull, 2019); and presented an 
opportunity for the United States to advance its interests 
and garner global influence through appeal rather than 
hard/military power. It is rooted in the study of power 
in international relations, and in the importunity to ad-
vance interests and maintain hegemony; it is intrinsical-
ly linked to a country’s public diplomacy strategy and its 
behaviour domestically and internationally. Each coun-
try’s ability to define and exercise its soft power in inter-
national relations is circumscribed by several domestic, 
historical, and technological contexts (Hayden, 2012)—it 
is highly relational and contextual in nature.
As an analytical concept, soft power is state-centric 
and influenced by the realist school of thought in inter-
national relations, where states are primary actors, and 
their role is central to understanding soft power as they 
propagate it from their identity and values (Hayden, 
2012; Nye, 2008). That said, the notion of the state is 
heavily contested. Stein and Andreotti (2015) contend 
that state interests are bounded by a “dominant glob-
al imaginary” rooted in Western supremacy, where the 
West is “understood to be at the top of a global hierarchy 
of humanity and human knowledge production (equated 
with economic success), with the rest of the world trail-
ing behind” (p. 235). The voices of Indigenous peoples 
and racialized minorities are often missing/silenced in 
Canada’s state interests. Canada, for instance, rarely 
acknowledges its colonial past or its contributions to a 
“racialized global capitalist system” (p. 229), yet contin-
ues to invest considerable resources to portray itself as a 
middle power, open, benevolent and multilateral in com-
mitment. However, scholars argue that Canada’s suite 
of domestic challenges—failures on Indigenous issues, 
building an oil pipeline, and political scandals—reduces 
its soft power (e.g., Amnesty International Canada, 2015; 
McClory, 2019).
There are two important considerations to weigh 
with relation to the theoretical framework and direction of 
this paper. First is the relational and contextual nature of 
soft power. It differs from one country to another and be-
tween countries because resources are finite and some 
relationships are more strategic and beneficial to pursue 
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than others. It bears noting that Canada’s foreign policy 
strategy is influenced by its colonial links to the U.K. and 
is considerably shaped by its geography and proximity 
to the United States—its largest trading partner. Second 
is the context of the era of new geopolitics. Scholars ar-
gue that there has been a shift away from the preponder-
ance of western power in the world, with a transition of 
power towards the East, with emerging economies and 
countries in the global South gaining sufficient economic 
strength (Hill & Beadle, 2014; McClory, 2019). Scholars 
also speak of this world of new geopolitics as a period 
of a “new cold war” between Russia and the West and 
increased bipolarity and competition between China and 
the United States (Jones, 2017, para. 4). While this new 
geopolitics has yet to fully take form, there is recognition 
of new realities where soft power is no longer a linear 
operation from the west to the rest. The global North no 
longer has a monopoly on cultivating appeal and gener-
ating soft power; emerging powers in the global South 
are actively strategizing and growing their soft power 
reserves.
International Education as Soft 
Power 
Soft power offers a useful framework in understanding 
the role of governments in IE. Several scholars speak to 
how higher education has been recognized as a crucial 
soft power tool to heighten the attractiveness of a given 
country or culture in world politics (Nye, 2008; Peterson, 
2014; Wojciuk, 2018). IE, particularly the education of 
international students, is frequently identified as a strong 
soft power resource to serve interests of specific nation 
states. This is because as an “international student re-
turns to his or her native country and takes over vital 
positions in the public or private sector, the individual 
will eventually affect his or her country’s trajectory and, in 
turn, [the host nation’s] foreign policy” (Mai, 2015, para. 
3). In an era of new geopolitics, higher education has 
a significant role to build and strengthen what Hayhoe 
(1989) refers to as international academic relations be-
tween countries/regions. The nature of international ac-
ademic relations is such that foreign affairs provide the 
nexus between the federal government, universities, and 
IE.
Canada’s IE approach was first initiated as an as-
pect of its foreign policy post-World War II. Its invest-
ment in Overseas Development Assistance Program 
resulted in the arrival of funded international students 
in the 1960s on Canadian campuses and the opening 
up of international offices to manage development co-
operation projects funded by the External Aid Office and 
later CIDA (Canadian International Development Agen-
cy; Shute, 1999). With shifting foreign policy priorities 
as “extension abroad of national policies” (Granatstein & 
Bothwell, 1990, p. 13), there was an interest in facilitat-
ing “contacts…between Canadian and foreign scholars” 
(Graham, 1976) through programs such as Canadian 
Studies Abroad in order to achieve the Government’s 
interest in the promotion of Canadian culture and diplo-
macy in the 1970s. This focus shifted yet again in the 
1980s and more so in the 1990s, when Canadian “for-
eign policy became trade policy” (Cohen, 2003, p. 109) 
and IE an important trade sector generating revenue for 
the Canadian economy through the recruitment of inter-
national students (Trilokekar, 2010). There has always 
been a link between Canadian foreign policy and IE; 
the Canadian government has had an interest in IE as 
a tool to cultivate its soft power, albeit its orientation has 
largely been in context of a western hegemonic world op-
erating with colonialist perspectives towards the global 
South (McCartney, 2016; Stein & Andreotti, 2015). 
Methodology 
Given the critical role the media plays in framing ed-
ucation policy issues (El Masri, 2019; Saraisky, 2015; 
Stack, 2007; Suspitsyna & Shalka, 2019), we deliberate-
ly chose to analyze media coverage of these two cases, 
how it takes up the conversation of changed geopolitics, 
and its implications for IE at Canadian universities. This 
is particularly important in the absence of any official 
statements on these issues from the federal government 
and Universities Canada. 
As mentioned, we focused on two incidents; the first, 
a tweet outlined above that was released from the office 
of Canada’s Foreign Minister on August 3, 2018; the sec-
ond the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, deputy chairwoman of 
the board and chief financial officer of Huawei on De-
cember 1, 2018. The resulting diplomatic tensions—the 
Saudi government recalled its ambassador and ejected 
the Canadian ambassador, and the Chinese government 
responded by detaining two Canadians in China and im-
posing some trade restrictions on Canadian products—
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had direct repercussions for Canadian universities. The 
Saudi government withdrew all its sponsored students 
by cancelling the scholarship program that funded their 
tuition and expenses. On the Canada-China front, while 
there have been no tangible reactions towards univer-
sities from the Chinese government, concerns remain 
about the influence these tensions might have on the 
single largest group of international students in Canada, 
in addition to Canadian universities’ research ties with—
and funds from—Chinese partners, including Huawei. 
We conducted a systematic scan of the Canadian 
digital and print media’s coverage from August 2018 to 
November 2019. Data was retrieved from three main 
media sources: (a) media releases from Global Affairs 
Canada, (GAC) the Canadian Bureau for International 
Education (CBIE) and Universities Canada; (b) articles 
from the three highest circulation English mainstream 
print newspapers The Globe and Mail, National Post, 
and Toronto Star (Newspapers Canada, 2016); and (c) 
major relevant Canadian education magazines: Policy 
Options, Maclean’s Magazine, and University Affairs. 
We also opted to include articles by other Canadian 
news outlets, such as the Canadian Broadcasting Cor-
poration (CBC) and city-specific newspapers, captured 
by University Affairs to ensure the inclusion of a wider 
array of perspectives and voices. Using a list of key 
search words (China/Saudi Arabia; IE and universities), 
we have a final corpus of 74 articles and news releases 
as outlined in Table 1. 
We acknowledge limitations in our methodology. We 
did not include French-language media and exclusive-
ly focused on the Canadian perspective (as opposed to 
that of Saudi, Chinese, or other foreign governments). 
With that in mind, we conducted a thematic analysis 
as a qualitative research technique to identify, analyze 
and report patterns/themes within data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). In particular, we identified narratives as they pro-
vide “an opportunity to map and re-map the connections 
between actors, ideas and institutions” (Lowndes, 2016, 
p. 103) and help identify issues, problems, consequenc-
es, and often solutions. Each of the three researchers 
analyzed and coded the data separately then met to 
compare and finalize data coding to come up with three 
dominant narratives.
Media Narratives 
While there were several narratives, we limited our anal-
ysis to the three most dominant ones in the interest of 
scope and space. We also identified actors/voices that 
mobilize each of these narratives, and those that provide 
oppositional and/or counter narratives.
Canadian Universities at Risk of Foreign 
Interference
The most dominant narrative (32/74 data entries) is fo-
cused on China. Here, the media examined China’s re-
lationship with Canadian universities through research 
collaborations and influence of Chinese students on 
issues of academic freedom, free speech, and safe-stu-
dent-spaces on Canadian campuses.
The media addressed two notions of Canadian uni-
versities’ research collaborations with China, through in-
dividual researchers and/or research funding. The first is 
perceived Chinese espionage in the form of 2,500 spon-
Table 1
Media Articles by Source
Media Releases Newspapers Magazines
GAC 0 National Post 10 University 
Affairs* 
31
Universities 
Canada
2 Globe and Mail 19 Policy Options 4
CBIE 1 Toronto Star 5 Maclean’s 2
* This number reflects the media entries compiled by University Affairs, excluding the ones already captured by the newspapers search.  
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sored military scientists and engineers collaborating 
with universities around the world, including Canada, 
to gather data and information towards improving mili-
tary technology (Leuprecht, 2018), effectively impacting 
Canadian national security and economic stability. The 
second is the perceived co-opting of the large numbers 
of Chinese faculty and researchers hosted on Canadian 
campuses to further Chinese interests (Quan, 2019a). 
International reports on China’s political ambitions and 
risks to universities are also referenced. For example, a 
report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Black-
well, 2019d) cites 687 collaborative papers between Ca-
nadian and Chinese researchers (Vanderklippe, 2018a) 
and lists Canada as the third-largest destination for Chi-
na’s People’s Liberation Army-sponsored researchers 
(Connolly, 2019). Chinese defence scientists are report-
ed to be working with Canadian scholars using names 
of non-existent civilian institutions in China rather than 
citing their military credentials (Vanderklippe, 2018a). 
Highly ranked Canadian universities are reported to be 
among the top 10 universities outside of China collab-
orating with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Le-
uprecht, 2018). Collaborations with Huawei have come 
to be targeted given their funding of millions of dollars 
to 10 Canadian universities, with whom Huawei subse-
quently is reported to have obtained full licensure for the 
patents that are realized (Green, 2018). Huawei is also 
reported to have partnered with the province of Ontar-
io in investing $212 million for “the creation of 250 new 
research and engineering jobs” focused on 5G (Green, 
2018, para. 25). These investments are perceived, ac-
cording to a former Canadian intelligence chief, to fa-
cilitate China’s “capacity to conduct remote spying and 
modify or steal information or even shut down systems” 
(Silcoff, 2019, para. 13) while gaining greater shares of 
intellectual property and ultimately global political and 
economic influence (Green, 2018). 
The media also reported mounting suspicion of 
Chinese government influence on Canadian campuses 
through Chinese students (e.g., Blackwell, 2019a; Dob-
by & Silcoff, 2019). Three incidents involving Chinese 
students were reported at different campuses: a petition 
to remove an elected student president who was also a 
Tibetan activist (CBC, 2018); a disruption of a presenta-
tion by an activist critical of the Chinese government’s 
treatment of Uyghur (Blackwell, 2019a); and a culture 
of fear among Uyghur international students preventing 
them from publicly criticizing China (McCuaig-Johnston, 
2019a). Some suggest that “the Chinese consulate [is] 
using students to infiltrate the academic field” (Xu & 
Friesen, 2019, para. 9), raising threats to free speech 
and academic freedom on Canadian campuses. The Ca-
nadian context is compared in the media to the United 
States, Australia, and the U.K. (Connolly, 2019). Articles 
refer to the closure of the Confucius Institutions in the 
United States and Australia and the cancellation of re-
search funds and collaborations with Huawei in promi-
nent American and British institutions (Bothwell, 2019; 
Hager, 2019; McCuaig-Johnston, 2019b). Media sources 
reference Australian universities’ commitment to a new 
code that requires them to share cyber intelligence with 
national security agencies, name overseas research 
partners, and list financial dealings with other coun-
tries. Effectively, reports allude to universities becom-
ing subject to tougher requirements when collaborating 
with foreign countries on research (VTN News Network, 
2019). In contrast, the media reports that Canadian uni-
versities continued to maintain their relationships with 
Huawei (Silcoff, 2019), which is perceived as “naivete 
on the part of the academic sector” (Blackwell, 2019b, 
para. 5). However, university administrators are quoted 
arguing that national security issues are the responsi-
bility of the government, as universities cannot “make 
assessments on issues of national security” (Vander-
klippe, 2018b, para. 10). Universities also highlighted 
that their commitment to academic freedom precludes 
their regulating areas of research pursued by faculty or 
graduate students (Vanderklippe, 2018b). After all, inter-
national scientific collaboration “is an essential part of 
being a research-intensive global university” (Vander-
klippe, 2018a, para. 35) and that “politicizing science, 
because of tensions between two countries” is unaccept-
able (Blackwell, 2019c, para. 6). 
Central to this narrative is the voice of the Cana-
dian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) that brings to 
the forefront the security risks for Canada when it en-
gages in research collaborations and hosting Chinese 
students and scholars on Canadian campuses. Media 
narratives reference a secret CSIS report that was said 
to have been shared with Ministers of the Federal Gov-
ernment, key Canadian research universities, and as-
sociations like Universities Canada, but not available 
to the public at large (see Berthiaume, 2019; Blackwell 
2019c; Vanderklippe, 2018a; Quan, 2019a). Supporting 
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the CSIS warnings are quotes in the media by faculty 
and subject experts in international/global affairs, public 
policy, and cyber security as well as select former dip-
lomats. Several research universities and some K–12 
public school boards are listed amongst these media 
narratives. Individual students implicated in this con-
troversy, such as the University of Toronto Scarborough 
elected student president and the Uyghur international 
students, are also heard as voices supporting this nar-
rative. In mobilizing this narrative, reference is made to 
how prominent universities in Australia, the U.K., and 
the United States (examples given of Oxford, Stanford, 
and MIT) are aligning their policies with national secu-
rity agendas. The media also reported that the Chinese 
Embassy and Consulates reject the view of national se-
curity threats for Canada. Additionally, Universities Can-
ada and individual Canadian universities speak to the 
importance of continued IE activity and collaborations 
between Canada and China. 
Canadian Universities’ Financial  
Sustainability at Risk
This second narrative (28/74 data entries) focused on 
highlighting how the lucrative IE business can face tre-
mendous economic consequences as a result of diplo-
matic rifts. It reported concern with the increased depen-
dence of Canadian universities on international student 
revenue. It promoted better risk management strategies 
on the part of both Canadian institutions and the govern-
ments in light of this dependence.
The media raised concerns that the new political 
climate would harm student recruitment. The articles re-
ported how the outcome of the fall-out with Saudi Arabia 
affected nearly 6,000 Saudi students and how “Canadian 
universities and colleges…lost $140 million in revenues 
as a result of the sudden disappearance of all these stu-
dents” (Usher, 2018, para. 1). The Council of Ontario Uni-
versities is reported as warning the public that “Ontario 
institutions alone stand to lose tens of millions of dollars, 
not including the overall economic impact from housing 
and living costs” (University Affairs, 2019, para. 8). Sev-
eral articles speak of how this impact is felt in both small 
and large provinces/universities, given that this revenue 
represents “more than the auto parts and lumber indus-
tries in Canada” (Arabian Business, 2018, para. 14). Ulti-
mately, reports stated a softened Saudi position “mitigat-
ed some of the anticipated cost to Canadian universities” 
(Friesen, 2019b, para. 7). However, media highlights that 
the Saudi experience exposed universities as “financial-
ly vulnerable to the vagaries of international politics and 
economics”(Usher, 2018, para. 7); notwithstanding, “the 
impact on revenue was relatively contained given that 
Saudi students comprised only a small component of in-
ternational students” (University Affairs, 2019, para. 12). 
The media reported how the Saudi incident has made 
many wonder: What might happen if China put a “halt to 
the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Chinese students 
abroad every year?” (Usher, 2018, para. 8). 
In the days following the arrest of the Huawei ex-
ecutive, reports spoke to how universities scrambled to 
assess the impact that rising Canada-China tensions 
could have on student enrolment, fundraising, and re-
search. Internal records show concerns of potential 
“credit risks for Canadian universities” (University Af-
fairs, 2019, para. 7). As the largest source of interna-
tional students in Canada, the media further expressed 
concern that “some Chinese students may be deterred 
by the current crisis” since “Canada is…receiving bad 
publicity in the Chinese state media” (Bothwell, 2019, 
para. 13). Chinese study abroad agencies are reported 
to be taking defensive measures in less enthusiastically 
promoting Canada (Yi, 2018). Since a relationship with 
China is crucial to the billion-dollar IE industry, university 
presidents were reported as having discussed the issue 
privately (Friesen, 2019c). There is clear recognition 
that “China remains important for Canada’s universi-
ties,” hence, “we’ve [Universities Canada] been in touch 
with Global Affairs just so they’re aware how important 
the relationship is to us and to Canada’s economy” (as 
quoted in Friesen, 2019c, para. 7). Several Canadian 
universities with significant foreign student populations 
said they have yet to see evidence of a decline in Chi-
nese enrolments (Du, 2019). However, others reported 
that certain specialized programs have been impacted 
(Vanderklippe, 2019; Quan, 2019b).
The media spoke to how concerns over possible 
interruptions of international student flows prompted 
both the federal government and universities to take 
measures. Federally, “the Saudi experience galvanized 
[federal] government attention” (Lewington, 2019, para. 
19). Concerned that more than half of the international 
students in Canada come from just two countries, Chi-
na and India, the federal government has pledged near-
ly $30 million over the next five years to diversify the 
source countries for recruitment. The articles reported 
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how the government targets countries with a large and 
growing middle class that may not yet have the higher 
education capacity to educate all their students (Friesen, 
2019a). Institutionally, Canadian universities are “add-
ing scholarships, hiring education agents, opening 
overseas offices, establishing overseas partnerships 
and recruiting alumni as word-of-mouth ambassadors” 
(Lewington, 2019, para. 4) to counter stiff competition for 
international students, and to be agile in the current era 
of new geopolitics. They report that university adminis-
trators learned that “unpredictable events beyond a uni-
versity’s control require officials to learn to be nimble…
[and] never sit comfortably with the [student] population” 
(Lewington, 2019, paras. 39–41). 
At the forefront of mobilizing this narrative are organi-
zations representing Canadian university interests, most 
notably Universities Canada, but also the Canadian Bu-
reau of International Education, the Conference Board of 
Canada, and the Council of Ontario Universities. In addi-
tion are a list of individual universities—research-inten-
sive such as Toronto, McGill, British Columbia, and Wa-
terloo, who speak to the importance of Huawei research 
funding, and York, Lakehead, New Brunswick, and PEI, 
among others—who either enrolled students from Saudi 
Arabia or have large numbers of Chinese international 
students. Few colleges are represented—Mohawk and 
Niagara are examples of those who lost a number of Sau-
di students. Among the voices heard are those of Chi-
na-specific programs, such as York’s Schulich School of 
Business Asia Management Program, the University of 
British Columbia’s China Council, and other China and 
Asia specialists who run IE programs in China. Adding 
to these institutional voices are those of the Teaching 
Hospitals and the Royal College of Physicians and Sur-
geons as actors that faced the negative repercussions of 
the Saudi Arabian government’s decision to withdraw its 
scholarship students. This narrative is given further cre-
dence through the mention of impact studies on financial 
risks and associated losses produced by Moody Inves-
tor Services (Wong, 2019). The Government of Cana-
da’s voice is represented through Statistics Canada and 
Global Affairs Canada’s policy imperative to diversify 
Canada’s international student body. The student voice 
heard is that of Saudi students who speak to the disrup-
tion of their otherwise enjoyable and rich experience at 
Canadian higher educational institutions. There were no 
voices reported countering this narrative. 
Universities Critical to Meeting Canada’s 
Future Global Success
The third narrative (12/74 data entries) recognized that 
Canada cannot afford to ignore emerging global powers. 
As Vice-Chancellor of the University of Waterloo, Feri-
dun Hamdullahpur suggested, “Now it’s time to move 
past the ‘China-is-rising’ narrative” and “recognize that 
economic winds blow to the East” (Hamdullahpur, 2019, 
para. 1). As China and India are predicted to overtake 
the United States as the world’s top economies by 2030, 
Canadian business and civil society leaders should in-
vest in building “Asia competencies” in language, cul-
ture, and business “so that this generation is ready to 
engage effectively with one of the largest economies in 
the world” (Davidson, 2018, para. 8). Articles suggested 
that “more needs to be done to ensure that the next gen-
eration of Canadians are confident, skilled and culturally 
prepared to engage with China in diplomacy, trade, sci-
ence, education, tech and beyond” (Kim & Touch, 2019, 
para. 7). They stated an urgent need for Canadians to 
invest in 
“China competencies” today, regardless of whether 
we consider China a friend or a foe. Now is not the 
time to scale back on our engagement with China. 
On the contrary, if we want to win our ‘hundred bat-
tles,’ we ought to be scaling it up. (Kim & Touch, 2019, 
para. 13)
Therefore, Canada should invest in educational 
exchanges with China (and other emerging powers) to 
meet its future diplomatic, trade, economic, and techno-
logical needs. 
Whereas Chinese research collaborations and 
large student presence at Canadian universities were 
a source of scepticism in the first narrative, they were 
perceived to present opportunities for Canada here. The 
media reported that the value of the Chinese “alumni 
network to building lasting relations in China cannot be 
overestimated” (Davidson, 2018, para. 10). Additionally, 
“China’s vast and growing middle class represents more 
than simply consumers; this is a generation of people 
who want to be global citizens, and they want that for 
their children, too” (Beck, 2018, para. 2). Therefore, Can-
ada’s educational and research connections with China 
“have enormous value and represent significant oppor-
tunities for our country” (Beck, 2018, para. 2). The focus, 
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the articles suggest, should be on “getting the relation-
ship right with China as this will have both immediate 
and long-term consequences for Canadians” (Davidson, 
2018, para. 13). The post-secondary education sector 
is identified as best poised to play a leadership role in 
fostering such partnerships and preparing the next-gen-
eration workforce to do business globally, particularly in 
Asia, and specifically in China. Investing in more inter-
national research and development collaborations and 
study abroad for Canadian students is considered cru-
cial. Articles critique the “one-way street” in our partner-
ship, because “Chinese students who come to Canada 
develop a high ‘Canadian competence,’ and those who 
return home take it with them. It’s a loss for Canada and 
a gain for China” (Beck, 2018, para. 8). Articles urge 
that “universities should be at the forefront of bridging 
the gap [because]…if…[they] don’t, our countries in the 
West are sure to fall behind one business venture, one 
research discovery and one person at a time” (Hamdul-
lahpur, 2019, para. 17). 
Supported by fewer articles, this narrative is sup-
ported by organizations invested in Canada’s trade 
relations with Asia, mainly China. Examples include 
the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Global Affairs 
Canada, Minister for Trade Diversification, and select 
Trade Commissioners and Canadian Ambassadors to 
China. Universities Canada remains an active support-
er, including individual universities with collaborative 
programs and ventures with China. Examples include 
the Ottawa-Tsinghua partnership and the University of 
Western Ontario’s research partnerships with China 
supported by the London mayor, London’s economic 
development corporation, and Western’s President and 
individual faculty members. Ironically, this narrative uses 
the U.K. and the United States as examples of countries 
that invest much more than Canada when it comes to 
IE relations with China. There are no student voices re-
ported speaking to this third narrative. David Mulroney, 
former Canadian diplomat to China, and a few members 
of the Conservative party are voices mentioned as op-
posing this narrative. 
Discussion 
In response to our first research question (what key is-
sues or concerns did Canada’s political strains with Sau-
di Arabia and China raise for Canadian universities’ IE 
initiatives), the three media narratives illustrate the im-
pact of (shifting) geopolitics on Canadian IE initiatives. 
The first narrative speaks to China’s rising global power 
as cause for national security concerns and violation of 
freedom of speech and academic freedom on Canadian 
campuses. The national security agenda raised in this 
narrative is a relatively new conversation—the only oth-
er reference in the media made post-9/11, when CSIS 
interviewed Muslim international students indiscrimi-
nately. This is likely a reaction to how China has globally 
positioned itself and has consistently and concertedly 
invested in expanding its reach and influence. China is 
perceived as an indispensable and growing power with 
a robust soft power strategy because of how it developed 
its outreach (Seib, 2016). It cultivated its cultural and 
soft power assets—starting with sending a few pandas 
to zoos abroad in 1990s, to developing a sophisticated 
operation that ranged from hosting the Olympics in 2008 
and World Expo in 2010—to build relationships and es-
tablish trade and security networks (Seib, 2016). Cana-
da is likely influenced by the strong national security nar-
rative in IE discourses in the United States (Campbell, 
2005; Trilokekar, 2015). It is worth stressing that issues 
of national security, freedom of speech, and academic 
freedom only arise in reference to China as Saudi Arabia 
is not perceived to pose a (security) threat. Giving voice 
to CSIS, cyber security experts, and international affairs 
experts, the media managed to create a sense of crisis 
in context of this narrative, hence representing IE as a 
national security threat. 
While the first narrative spoke to the politics of IE, 
the second and third narratives focused on the econom-
ic impact for Canada and its universities. Supported by 
(representatives of) Canadian universities, the second 
narrative speaks to the tremendous economic impact 
international students have on universities and com-
munities, given the withdrawal of Saudi students from 
Canadian universities and an impending crisis if Chi-
nese students stop enrolling in Canadian universities. It 
is clear that interests lie in protecting IE as a business 
strategy. The third narrative, while largely focused on 
economic benefits for Canada as a nation, is globalist 
in nature. It recognizes a new geopolitical order and the 
growing importance of Asian countries like China and ar-
gues for Canada’s engagement in more active two-way 
educational exchanges with partner countries (unlike the 
one-way, inward-looking focus of the second narrative). 
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It speaks to more investment in IE versus the second 
narrative that speaks to IE solely as income. To con-
clude, all three narratives address the impact of the po-
litical fall-outs with China and Saudi Arabia on Canadian 
universities. The focus is on distinctly different impacts: 
political exposure and vulnerability of Canadian univer-
sities to foreign governments; economic dependence of 
Canadian universities on revenue from foreign students; 
and the need for IE to enable Canada to remain compet-
itive in a fast changing world of new and rising powerful 
economies. Media articles largely mobilize the first nar-
rative, framing IE as a vehicle for foreign governments 
to infiltrate Canadian universities and society, and thus 
construct IE as problematic and risky.
Our second research question was: What concerns 
do these cases raise about Canadian approaches to IE 
in an era of new geopolitics? Interestingly, before the 
fall-out with Saudi Arabia and China, Canada’s success 
in recruiting international students who chose Canada 
because of its reputation was lauded, as Canada was 
“especially appealing at present given current geopolit-
ical realities [emphasis added]” (Hoult, 2019, para. 2). 
Canadian universities were perceived to be winners 
in comparison to competitor countries that significant-
ly restricted immigration regulations for international 
students; a manifestation of counter-globalisation, an-
ti-liberalisation and anti-immigration sentiment—results 
of developments like Brexit, and the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the United States. The so-called 
“Trump bump” was celebrated as “international students 
and faculty who might once have considered America 
the best place to get an education are fleeing our south-
ern neighbour” (Paikin, 2019, para. 3). Canada capital-
ised on its image as “a beacon of stability, openness, 
tolerance and inclusion,” and is “seen as an increasingly 
rare bright light on the world stage” (Gertler, 2016, para. 
6). In a strategic soft power move, the Government of 
Canada’s updated IE strategy was labelled: Building on 
Success: International Education Strategy (2019-2024).
The media articles, however, suggest a more cau-
tious and critical perspective on Canada’s IE approach-
es. This is particularly evident in the second and third 
narratives. The second narrative forewarns the econom-
ic vulnerability of Canadian universities as they become 
increasingly dependent on single markets like China or 
Saudi Arabia, and recommends securing this income 
stream by diversifying Canada’s trade portfolio in educa-
tion by entering new markets and diversifying its source 
countries of international students (GOC, 2019, p. 4). It 
maintains the status quo of IE as trade or business for 
the central purpose of protecting Canada’s economic 
benefits. While IE may be impacted by political tensions, 
it is not considered an inherently political activity, nor 
one that is dramatically shifting in its very nature under 
new and emerging geopolitical contexts. The third narra-
tive critiques Canada’s short-sighted approach to IE and 
advocates for investment in more IE initiatives keeping 
borders and investments in two-way relationships yet it 
is motivated by securing Canadian economic interests. 
While the first narrative is not directly critical of IE, 
it speaks to its role in raising issues of national securi-
ty and academic freedom. This construction of IE could 
instigate a backlash against Canada’s engagement in 
IE, as it mobilizes colonial and discriminatory narra-
tives. Scholars warn that the construction of Chinese 
students as activists and China as a threat to “corrupting 
the core value of the Western world ‘that lie at the heart 
of our universities’ freedom” (Suspitsyna, 2015, p. 31) 
reproduce persistent colonial imaginaries of the Orient 
or the “post-colonial other” (Suspitsyna & Shalka, 2019, 
p. 287). Lee and Rice (2007) speak of these imageries 
in the media as reproducing neo-colonial and neo-racist 
discourses on campuses based on an individual’s coun-
try of origin. Positioning China on the one hand as risky 
for contaminating the culture, value, and traditions of 
Canadian universities, and on the other hand as a threat 
to West’s economic, academic, and political superiority 
epitomize the (white) fear of being engulfed by differ-
ence that upsets the assumed hierarchies of cultures, 
races, and ethnicities (Suspitsyna, 2015; Suspitsyna & 
Shalka, 2019).
There is an absence of discussion in the media that 
recognizes the limitations of Canada’s IE approach in 
context of new developments. Scholars allude to how, 
in this new world of geopolitics, many countries have 
witnessed a steady—if not sharp—increase in invest-
ment in soft power resources and cultivation (McClory, 
2019). The Soft Power 30 (McClory, 2019) identifies 
six categories to measure and rank soft power in thirty 
countries, with education being a key category. Since 
the 1990s, international branch campuses have sprout-
ed across Asia and the Middle East, with these regions 
developing as educational hubs attracting international 
students from within the region and offering expanded 
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opportunities for their own citizens. Asia is at the helm in 
engaging with the world, investing heavily in education 
and infrastructure, creating targeted public and cultural 
diplomacy programmes and initiatives, and challenging 
the decades old privilege of Western organizations like 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) and Group of Seven (G7) and their 
interests (Mok, 2012; Sinclair, 2017). Sinclair (2017) 
proclaims that the most radical change that Canada’s 
worldview needs to take into account is the emergence 
of the global South as a major driver. Palamar and Jar-
dine (2012) and Gurry (2012) speak of India and China 
as the future giants of world higher education in what 
is spoken of as the Asian century (Morgan, 2016). Chi-
na has two centrepieces to its foreign policy agenda: 
an ever-expanding network of Confucius Institutes and 
The Belt and Road Initiative allowing it to engage with 
138 countries (Belt & Road Portal, 2019). It has moved 
away from a solely inward orientation in international-
ization (importing higher education models from abroad) 
to a distinct outward engagement (positioning itself as 
emerging global models of higher education). China’s 
rising power as a major player claiming regional and 
global leadership is associated with its investments in 
IE as soft power in its own image (Li, 2018), resulting 
in its attractiveness as an IE destination. This is a dif-
ferent world from the post-World War II world when Can-
ada was largely advantaged in IE. Today, new mobility 
patterns include South-South models of collaboration, 
breaking the traditional South-North pattern. 
In the media, there are no questions asked or chal-
lenges put forth for Canada’s approaches to IE giv-
en these shifting geopolitical contexts. The university 
community in particular is silent, suggesting that these 
concerns are arguably far from the minds of most of our 
policy makers. How should global South initiatives and 
IE initiatives in Asia influence our approach to IE? How 
can domestic priorities of decolonization, indigeniza-
tion, and equity, diversity, and inclusion within Canadian 
higher education redefine our approaches to IE within 
this new geopolitical context? What can Canadian soft 
power enable with regards to our engagement with IE as 
a political versus a purely economic enterprise? These 
important questions remain unaddressed. It is within this 
context that we recommend taking action in the form of 
developing a comprehensive foreign policy and IE strat-
egy that is grounded in what we label as engaged soft 
power. Engaged soft power is a reorientation of focus 
that acknowledges the projection and the reception of 
the manifestations of soft power, as a two-way street. 
It is based on a fundamental premise that the West no 
longer dominates the projection of soft power, but is also 
a recipient, and thus challenges earlier notions of power 
and hegemony. Sinclair (2017) encourages Canada to 
adopt “inclusive approaches, not hold on to shaky privi-
lege,” “favour multilateral approaches,” and “create new 
partnerships of our own with key nations of the global 
South,” urging Canada to realize that “today’s uncertain-
ty should make it clearer than ever why we need to move 
beyond a global perspective largely shaped by relations 
with the U.S. and EU” (para. 16). Canadian foreign pol-
icy has been economically focused for nearly three de-
cades, but the current geopolitical landscape suggests 
the need for more informed and engaged strategy that 
can weather diplomatic storms and not run the risk of 
significant economic or political repercussions. 
Our third and final question was: What implications 
can be drawn from these cases about Canadian uni-
versity-government relations in the context of geopoli-
tics? Media articles described university-government 
relations in three distinct ways. The first narrative re-
inforced a view that universities are direct arms of the 
government. In this case, media articles reference how 
Australian universities were asked to report collabo-
rations with any foreign entities and how international 
agreements signed by universities need to come under 
government regulations, implying they should be in sync 
with the government’s foreign policy priorities. Canadian 
universities were also portrayed as naive in operating 
independently of the government (Blackwell, 2019a). 
Media articles that spoke to the vulnerability of Cana-
dian universities to foreign interference further stoked 
these sentiments by comparing governmental or organ-
isational policies in the United States, U.K., and Austra-
lia that have “made clear that internationalisation as a 
goal in itself is to be secondary to the country’s global 
advancement and security interests” (Lee, 2019, para. 
1). As Marginson (2019) states, “we have been brutally 
reminded that politics is primary, and when government 
sneezes then universities catch cold. When government 
is threatened, or its fundamental interests are at stake, 
then universities will be expected to conform” (para. 1). 
The media alluded to secret meetings between CSIS and 
select Canadian universities and Universities Canada, 
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however, the details about these meetings is not known. 
It can, however, be assumed that universities are recog-
nizing government concerns regarding possible foreign 
interference. The second and third narratives reinforce 
the role of universities as serving broader governmen-
tal economic and trade agendas and thus, as working in 
cooperation with the government to secure these goals. 
IE is viewed here as essentially a non-political venture, 
pursued by both governments and universities to serve 
Canada’s national economic interests. In this sense Ca-
nadian universities are perceived as national institutions 
fulfilling the broader goals of the Canadian government’s 
interests in maintaining Canada’s economic advantag-
es, nationally and internationally. 
Running through the first narrative is an implicit but 
oppositional perspective that universities are distinct 
actors from governments, whose purpose is to pursue 
“Science vs. Security” (Lee, 2019, para. 21), i.e., a view 
that sees “universities, as global knowledge producers 
and disseminators [that should] not [be] bordered in 
the changing political climate by a perceived [nation-
al] threat” (Lee, 2019, para. 16) precisely because the 
role of the university is distinct from that of the govern-
ment. University researchers and faculty members who 
are invested in maintaining institutional autonomy, ac-
ademic freedom, and international scientific collabora-
tion mostly voice this view and speak of the dangers of 
politicizing science (see for example, Blackwell, 2019b; 
Vanderklippe, 2018a). This is a notion referenced as 
scientific globalism, which views science as universal 
and not bound by any political borders. Science is guid-
ed by norms established by the scientific community, 
and therefore the knowledge derived through scientific 
enquiry is accessible to all (Sá & Sabzalieva, 2018). It 
supports the view that “limiting international ties and 
curbing knowledge production within a bordered bubble 
will not benefit any nation-state or global society” (Lee, 
2019, para. 50). While this perspective is not explicit and 
not one that is elaborated within the media articles, it 
is a view that is central to our concept of engaged soft 
power. Universities are the most ideal vessels for the 
development of an IE strategy precisely because their 
commitment to collaboration is boundless. As receptors 
of soft power projections, they engage with a multitude 
of perspectives, values, and ideologies—inspiring and 
advocating for an engaged soft power strategy. However, 
what is paramount is that in this endeavour universities 
carve their own unique niche and role. Universities have 
a role to play in reminding governments that they need 
to engage in a foreign policy that is both outward looking 
and globally engaged, keep their borders open to allow 
mobility both in and out of their academic institutions, 
but perhaps most importantly, respect and allow for uni-
versity autonomy and academic freedom with minimum 
government oversight and control of IE programs. This 
will allow universities to contribute to what they do best: 
promote free flow of ideas, collaboration, and partner-
ship within and across people and borders. 
Conclusion 
Canadian media coverage of educational matters tends 
to be strongly linked to global, national, and provincial 
geopolitical and socio-economic events, particularly 
those that are “new, controversial, and [have] an imme-
diate impact on the public’s lives and interests” (El Mas-
ri, 2020, p. 377). Our research revealed that the media 
actively discussed the impact of Canada’s fall-out with 
Saudi Arabia and China on Canadian Universities. It also 
raised concerns about Canada’s approaches to IE in two 
ways; first, as a risk to national security and maintaining 
Canada’s power and hegemony as part of the western 
world. Second, it illustrated IE as the vehicle for Cana-
da’s economic prosperity and in turn its global economic 
power and hegemony. However, what the media has not 
achieved is a broader discussion on how Canada needs 
to revisit its IE objectives and approaches in light of 
broader geopolitical shifts. The two cases we examined 
serve to vividly illustrate the close tie between global pol-
itics, government foreign policy, and IE within Canadian 
Universities. Moving forward, Canada’s approach to IE 
has to be visioned and imagined in the context of new 
and shifting geo-politics and its commitments to decolo-
nization and the rights of Indigenous and racialized mi-
norities. This is what we label as an engaged soft power 
approach, a reorientation of focus that acknowledges the 
projection and the reception of the manifestations of soft 
power, including IE, as a two-way street.
We outline three recommendations moving forward. 
First, Canada’s approach to IE as business as usual has 
to change. The current context of the COVID-19 pan-
demic reveals gaps in Canada’s IE approaches. The 
primary concern across governments and universities 
is reduced to international enrolment and subsequent 
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loss in revenue (Usher, 2020). This sentiment speaks to 
a stubborn prevalence in perceiving IE as revenue gen-
erating, and assuming Canada’s global attractiveness. 
Marginson (2019) speaks about changing global mobility 
trends during and post COVID-19 suggesting that part of 
the East-to-West student traffic will shift into East Asian 
mobility traffic permanently. He argues that East Asia 
will now rise further in IE “because of strong health and 
governance regimes and the bounce back factor” (para. 
18). Second, in engaging IE as soft power, Canada has 
to challenge its basic assumptions of Western suprema-
cy and make genuine efforts towards more collaborative, 
mutually beneficial partnerships. During the COVID-19 
period, there have been signs of Sinophobia where 
Chinese students (and Canadian Chinese nationals) re-
ported racism and anti–Asian sentiments in Canadian 
universities and in broader society (Moir, 2020; Leach, 
2020). These sentiments speak to the limiting impact IE 
has had in understanding the other and our vulnerability 
in falling back on superior colonial Western imageries. 
Third, Ang et al. (2015) suggest:
…cultural diplomacy can move beyond the national 
interest [and towards greater mutuality] only if this 
move itself can be understood as being in the nation-
al interest. Further research, including in other coun-
tries and regions, is required to finesse the implica-
tions of this understanding. (p. 379)
Conversations about the need for a new IE approach 
in the context of geopolitics needs to be picked up by the 
media. This is where the role of the universities, schol-
ars, academics, and students is paramount. 
It is important to consider whose voice is present 
and absent in supporting media narratives. Based on the 
tally of media articles reviewed (see Table 1) most are 
from specialized newsletters that circulate among spe-
cific professionals versus that reach the general public. 
Also, whereas Global Affairs Canada, Universities Cana-
da and the Canadian Bureau of Education—all organiza-
tions with vested interests in IE—respond to newspaper 
queries, they do not proactively put forth position state-
ments on this subject. The actors whose voices support 
each of three narratives reveal their inherent investment 
in perpetuating them. The first narrative represents the 
voice of national security experts, with CSIS most prom-
inently represented; the second, university representa-
tives that enjoy the most direct economic gains from IE; 
and the third, professionals invested in Canada-China 
trade relations. In examining the IE higher education 
policy context in Canada, El Masri (2020) observes that, 
while the media offered a platform for very diverse play-
ers to express opinions, access to this platform was not 
even. Whereas politicians, civil servants, and econom-
ic, foreign affairs, business and trade experts and pro-
fessionals’ voices were strongly present in the media’s 
coverage of educational matters, the presence of faculty 
members, particularly post-secondary education and IE 
scholars, was very limited (El Masri, 2019). Similar to El 
Masri’s (2019; 2020) findings, the voices heard in the 
media are mainly university upper administrators. If in-
dividual faculty researchers are quoted, they are faculty 
in economics, business and international affairs, while 
voices of faculty and scholars of post-secondary educa-
tion and IE are missing. In this mediatized age, El Masri 
(2020) argues that the media has created new political 
stages and provided access to (new) actors. We concur 
with El Masri’s (2019) call for IE scholars and faculty 
members to serve as public intellectuals in the media in 
an effort to reshape IE discourses in Canada; building 
awareness among the general public about IE—its value 
and benefits as well as the intrinsic tie between national 
and broader global benefits. 
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